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THE INTERSECTION OF FREE SPEECH AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
CONSTRAINTS ON LAWYERS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Kathleen M. Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
L AWYERS' freedom of speech is constrained in many ways that no
one would challenge seriously under the First Amendment. Rules
of evidence and procedure, bans on revealing grand jury testimony,
page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous pleadings, to name a
few, are examples of speech limitations that are widely accepted as
functional necessities in the administration of justice, much like rules
of order in a town meeting. Numerous bar regulations of lawryer
speech, however, have provoked First Amendment clashes, and the
outcomes in those cases reveal much about competing conceptions of
the legal profession.
On the one hand, lawyers are sometimes perceived as classic speak-
ers in public discourse, free of state control and entitled to all the ordi-
nary protections of speech and association available to other speakers.
Indeed, in light of their frequent role as representatives of underdogs
and challengers to the state and the status quo, lawyers may be per-
ceived to be entitled to extraordinary speech protections. On the
other hand, lawyers are sometimes thought of as delegates of state
power-officers of the court and professional licensees whose special
privileges are conditioned upon foregoing some speech rights that
others enjoy. The tension between these two conceptions recurs in
cases involving lawyer solicitation, lawyer speech to the press, and
lawyer advertising. This Article reviews and analyzes these cases and
then attempts to place this tension in a broader First Amendment
context.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT LINITS ON REGULATION
OF LAWYERS' ETHICS
Lawyers, as professionals, are subjected to speech restrictions that
would not ordinarily apply to lay persons.
These restrictions have been particularly prevalent in the areas of
solicitation of clients, lawyer interaction with the media, and lawyer
advertising. The following sections examine speech limitations in
these three areas.
* Stanley Morrison Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
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A. Solicitation
Solicitation, written or verbal, is of course a speech act, but not all
speech acts are constitutionally protected. Solicitation of murder or
any other serious crime is unprotected whether viewed as valueless at
the threshold or as outweighed by obviously compelling interests in
any balance. On the other hand, political party recruitment drives or
invitations to attend advocacy group meetings are close to the core of
protected speech. In the Supreme Court's several decisions reviewing
the constitutionality of regulation of the solicitation of legal business,
much has turned on whether the Court identified the litigation efforts
at issue as quasi-political.
A successful challenge to a legal solicitation ban provided the occa-
sion for one of the cornerstone decisions in First Amendment freedom
of association. In NAACP v. Button,' the Court held unconstitutional
a Virginia prohibition of "the improper solicitation of any legal or
professional business" as applied to the efforts of the NAACP legal
staff to recruit plaintiffs for desegregation suits.' The state had out-
lawed running and capping, expanding their definitions to include re-
ferrals to an organization that paid lawyers in connection with any
judicial proceeding "in which it has no pecuniary right or liability.' 3
Applying the strictest scrutiny, the Court held six to three that the law
failed to serve any compelling interest in these circumstances.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan emphasized the considerable
element of political expression involved in litigation on behalf of un-
popular causes: "Groups which find themselves unable to achieve
their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts."4
Moreover, he stated that group litigation efforts are sometimes a par-
ticularly effective form of political association. On the other side of
the balance, he found little of the traditional conflict-of-interest justifi-
cation for outlawing solicitation: where "no monetary stakes are in-
volved . . . there is no danger that the attorney will ... subvert the
paramount interests of his client to enrich himself or an outside spon-
sor." 5 Moreover, he did not find the NAACP's efforts likely to stir up
litigation in the manner traditionally thought to justify solicitation
bans: "Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights
is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use
of the legal process for purely private gain. '"6
Of course, the majority was concerned in large part that Virginia's
effort to police legal professionalism was directed selectively at the
NAACP's desegregation lawsuits; Southern states had sought to foil
1. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
2. See id. at 428-29.
3. Id. at 423.
4. Id. at 429.
5. Id. at 443.
6. Id.
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desegregation efforts with everything in the regulatory arsenal from
solicitation bans to parking tickets.7 Despite this underlying concern
with the context of racial resistance and the vindication of equal pro-
tection rights, the opinion was broad enough to lay the basis for a
series of decisions holding that labor unions, like ideological advocacy
groups, had a First Amendment right to give unsolicited legal advice
and referrals to their members. 8 As Justice Black summarized these
cases, "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment,"9 and thus the scope of professional ethics regulation
that could be applied to such activity was limited.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Button, took a different view of law-
yers' roles. Whereas the Brennan opinion treats NAACP lawyers as
vindicators of constitutional rights against the state, the Harlan dissent
depicts them as closer to the state's own agents, noting that "the regu-
lation of professional standards for members of the bar" is more
deeply rooted than regulation of other professionals "since courts for
centuries have possessed disciplinary powers incident to the adminis-
tration of justice."' 0 Also, unlike Brennan's account of NAACP law-
yers as an integral part of the associational activities of the NAACP,
Harlan's dissent paints lawyers as professionally restricted to the role
of personal representation of individuals, and thus vulnerable to con-
flicts of interest even in the context of legal advocacy that is not for
profit:
[T]he interests of the NAACP go well beyond the providing of com-
petent counsel for the prosecution or defense of individual claims;
they embrace broadly fixed substantive policies that may well often
deviate from the immediate, or even long-range, desires of those
who choose to accept its offers of legal representations.1"
A similar dichotomy between lawyers as participants in protected
speech and association on the one hand and as regulable licensees of
the state on the other was drawn in the pair of solicitation cases the
Court decided in 1978. In re Primus2 held invalid under the First
Amendment the application of a state anti-solicitation rule to an at-
torney who wrote a letter to a woman who had been sterilized as a
7. See id. at 444.
8. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971) (invalidating
an injunction against a union's legal services fee plan); United Mine Workers of
Amer. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (invalidating an unauthor-
ized-practice injunction against a union's use of a salaried attorney to assist with
workmen's compensation claims); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (invalidating an injunction against a union for solicitation and unau-
thorized practice of law for referring members to personal injury attorneys).
9. United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 585.
10. Button, 371 U.S. at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Id at 463 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
condition of continued receipt of public assistance, informing her that
the ACLU was willing to represent her free of charge in a lawsuit
against the doctor who had sterilized her. 3 In contrast, Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n 4 upheld against First Amendment challenge the
application of a state bar anti-solicitation rule to a stereotypical ambu-
lance chaser-a lawyer who had sought to represent two teenage girls
injured in an auto accident in exchange for a cut of any recovery.15
Writing for the Court in both decisions, Justice Powell conceded the
state's substantial interest in "tak[ing] measures to correct the sub-
stantive evils of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, in-
vasion of privacy, conflict of interest, and lay interference that
potentially are present in solicitation of prospective clients by law-
yers."16 But these interests were sufficient to justify sanctions only
against Ohralik, not Primus. Since Primus' solicitation was motivated
not by hope of pecuniary gain but by the "goal of vindicating civil
liberties,"17 only a showing of actual harm, not potential harm, would
be sufficiently compelling to justify discipline, and there was no show-
ing of actual harm in the record. The mere potential harm present in
the general run of solicitation cases, however, was enough to justify
the prophylactic rule applied to commercially motivated solicitation
such as Ohralik's.
By applying more exacting scrutiny in Primus than in Ohralik, the
Court in effect declared a constitutionally compelled exception to pro-
phylactic anti-solicitation rules for politically motivated nonprofit ad-
vocacy. Legal solicitation without such a political component could be
more readily regulated in large part because of the special interest of
the state in maintaining standards among lawyers, who "are essential
to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and
have historically been 'officers of the courts."' 18  Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Primus and concurring only in the judgment in Ohralik,
was the only member of the Court who would have been an equal
opportunity statist in the two decisions, finding the government
equally free to regulate members of the bar regardless of whether they
are politically or commercially motivated.' 9
B. Lawyers' Statements to the Press
Commentary about pending judicial proceedings has often pro-
voked First Amendment clashes with the values of fair trial for the
13. See id. at 439.
14. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
15. See id. at 468.
16. Primus, 436 U.S. at 426.
17. Id. at 430.
18. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
792 (1975)).
19. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 440-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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litigants and institutional respect for the courts. The Supreme Court
has long held that press or public commentary is punishable only upon
a showing of a "clear and present danger" of harm, rejecting argu-
ments that any mere probabilistic tendency to interfere with the or-
derly administration of justice was enough to justify suppression. 0
The Court, though, has not taken the same approach to lawyer com-
mentary on pending cases.
The Court's principal decision on First Amendment protection for
lawyer commentary to the press about a pending matter replays the
tension that appears in the solicitation cases between the roles of law-
yers as political gadflies and as officers of the court. In Gentile v. State
Bar,21 the Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge to a bar disci-
plinary sanction leveled against a criminal defense attorney who had
given a post-indictment press conference in which he suggested that
his client was an innocent scapegoat, that the actual perpetrator was a
crooked police detective, and that others likely to testify as witnesses
were drug dealers and money launderers.2 The bar rule at issue pro-
hibited a lawyer from making "an extrajudicial statement ... if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."' In
a split decision, the Court held that the "substantial likelihood" stan-
dard was constitutional, because the First Amendment did not require
a showing of clear and present danger of actual harm.24 The sanction
against Gentile was unconstitutional, however, because the rule's ex-
emption for speech stating "the general nature of the ... defense"'' z -
a safe harbor Gentile thought he was within-was void for
vagueness. 6
Justice Kennedy, writing for the minority that would have held that
the government had failed to demonstrate sufficiently clear and pres-
20. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (in-
validating the conviction of a newspaper publisher for reporting a pending judicial
disciplinary proceeding); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1947) (reversing the
contempt citations of a newspaper editor for publishing inaccurate criticisms of ajudge in a landlord-tenant case); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349-50 (1946)
(invalidating the contempt citation of a newspaper for editorializing against failure to
prosecute vice crimes); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,272-73 (1941) (invalidating
contempt citations of newspaper for editorializing in favor of convicting union activ-
ists and union leader for publishing a threat to strike).
21. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
22. See id. at 1041-42 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
23. Id at 1033 (quoting Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 177(1)) (opinion of Kennedy. J.).
24. See id at 1062-76.
25. Id. at 1048 (quoting Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 177(3)(a)).
26. This portion of the judgment was set forth in an opinion by Justice Kennedy.
See id at 1048-51. Each portion of the judgment was decided by a vote of five to four,
with Justice O'Connor providing the crucial swing vote, joining Chief Justice Rehn-
quist as to the constitutionality of the "substantial likelihood" standard and Justice
Kennedy as to the unconstitutional vagueness of the exemption. See id. at 1081-82
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
1998]
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ent danger of trial prejudice, echoed the Brennan opinion in Button:
"[T]his case involves classic political speech... critical of the govern-
ment and its officials."'27 Under this view, the speech of a criminal
defense attorney alleging police corruption and seeking to counter the
impression of his client put forward by elected prosecutors is at the
core of the First Amendment's function in checking government
power. Precisely because the attorney was close to the administration
of justice, he had special insight and ought to be allowed special lee-
way to make statements that inform the public about that process and
criticize the conduct of public officials within it: "[I]n some circum-
stances press comment is necessary to protect the rights of the client
and prevent abuse of the courts."2 8 Thus, the Kennedy opinion would
have applied to pretrial speech by lawyers something close to the strict
scrutiny that applies to press coverage of pretrial proceedings.
In sharp contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist, recalling the Harlan
opinion in Button and his own dissent in Primus, held for the majority
that lawyer speech may be penalized on a lesser showing of public
interest than press commentary on a pending trial, precisely because
lawyers are officers of the court.29 Their special privilege of access to
information and the special authority conferred on their statements by
virtue of their professional license, under this view, impose special ob-
ligations of expressive restraint rather than special entitlement to
speak freely. As the Chief Justice's opinion portrayed it, lawyer
speech outside the courtroom about a pending proceeding was only a
few steps on a continuum away from the "extremely circumscribed"
leeway for speech in the courtroom itself.3" Moreover, the State
ought to be able to protect itself from having its own officers impose
the "costs on the judicial system" of protracted voir dire, change of
venue, or other devices to offset the effects of their public remarks.
Accordingly, all that the First Amendment required was a balancing,
and "the 'substantial likelihood of material prejudice' standard consti-
tutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amend-
ment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's interest in
fair trials."32
C. Lawyer Advertising
Advertising is often regulated as part of more comprehensive eco-
nomic regulation aimed either at protecting consumers from decep-
27. Id. at 1034 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
28. Id. at 1058 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
29. See id. at 1071-74; see also id. at 1081 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
lawyers take an oath to uphold professional conduct rules as a condition of bar
admission).
30. Id. at 1071.
31. Id. at 1075.
32. Id.
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tion, coercion, and decisions based on insufficient information, or at
influencing the supply or demand for goods or services. For just this
reason, it has long occupied an uneasy position in the post-New Deal
constitutional universe: subject to any minimally rational regulation if
thought of as economic activity, but protected by the more exacting
requirements of the First Amendment if thought of as speech.33 Once
banished from First Amendment protection altogether along with ob-
scenity, fighting words, and libel, commercial speech has been given
qualified First Amendment protection ever since the Court's 1976 de-
cision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council,34 which struck down a ban on advertising prices of
prescription drugs.35 The qualifications are: that the government may
regulate false or misleading commercial speech freely, unlike most
other false or misleading speech;3 6 that advertisements of illegal trans-
actions may be banned even if they fall short of otherwise proscrib-
able incitement;37 and that all commercial speech regulations are
subject to a form of intermediate scrutiny, 8 even if they are content-
based and thus would otherwise trigger strict review.39 The Court has
rested these distinctions upon what Virginia State Board called "com-
monsense differences" between commercial speech and other kinds of
speech, particularly the "greater objectivity and hardiness" of adver-
tisements, which make them easier to verify and harder to chill.4"
The Court's extension of free speech protection to advertising has
provoked the criticism that it revives the spirit of Lochner v. New
York,4' substituting judicial for legislative judgments of what degree of
33. See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-His-
tory of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993) (offering methods for under-
standing the First Amendment's application to commercial speech and to speech in
general); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
Va. L. Rev. 627 (1990) (discussing the senselessness of the commercial/noncommercial
distinction under the First Amendment).
34. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
35. See id. at 770.
36. See id. at 771 n.24. In contrast, false statements on public issues are often
protected. See, eg., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 62 (1982) (holding that a politi-
cian may not be sanctioned for false promises in an election campaign absent a com-
pelling state interest); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)
(constitutionalizing protection for negligent or inadvertent libel of public officials).
37. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Normally, before speech may be
constitutionally regulated, advocacy of crime must be intended and likely to bring
about imminent serious violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
38. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (crystallizing the standard of review in the context of commercial speech
cases).
39. See id. at 564 n.6.
40. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. These differences have also led the
Court to deny commercial speech the protection of the presumption against prior
restraint, see id, and the benefit of overbreadth doctrine, see Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 379-81 (1977).
41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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regulation best serves the public's economic welfare.42 On the other
hand, First Amendment deregulation of commercial speech has also
been frankly defended on the ground that it increases consumer wel-
fare. Virginia State Board was litigated and won by Alan Morrison
and other attorneys for the Public Citizen Litigation Group, a con-
sumer advocacy organization affiliated with consumer rights activist
Ralph Nader. They aimed deliberately at undercutting the rents en-
joyed by professional monopolies, such as pharmacists, by increasing
price competition and lowering barriers to entry. As one scholarly
defender of the economic theory of Virginia State Board notes: "More
information makes consumers better informed; better-informed con-
sumers shop more wisely, which increases price competition; and con-
sumers' ability to find out more cheaply about sellers and their terms
of trade likewise facilitates the entry of new suppliers."43
Leaving lawyer advertising aside for the moment, the path of com-
mercial speech decisions after Virginia State Board has been some-
what uneven. In one series of cases, the Court appeared to retreat
from the key premises of Virginia State Board. In Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,44 which involved a
First Amendment challenge to a ban on promotional advertising by an
electric utility, the Court found that government had a substantial in-
terest in reducing demand for electricity and that the advertising ban
directly advanced that interest.45 Whereas Virginia State Board had
labeled any effort to keep consumers ignorant in order to influence
their consumption decisions as impermissibly "paternalistic," Central
Hudson appeared to suggest that government could indeed do just
that.46
Following similar logic, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tour-
ism Co.47 upheld a ban on the advertisement of casino gambling to
residents of Puerto Rico, reasoning that the greater power to ban
gambling entailed the lesser power to suppress gambling advertising in
order to reduce demand.48 Furthermore, in United States v. Edge
42. See Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Eco-
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 25-36 (1979).
43. Fred S. McChesney, De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court's Latest
Commercial Speech Cases, 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 81, 87 (1997).
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
45. See id. at 569 ("There is an immediate connection between advertising and
demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless
it believed that promotion would increase its sales."). The Court went on to strike
down the ban anyway because it swept too far, reaching even promotion of substitute
energy products whose use would not increase total energy consumption. See id. at
570.
46. See id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that this was the first time the
Court had stated that advertising might be suppressed in order to "'dampen' demand
for or use of the product" advertised).
47. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
48. See id. at 345-46.
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Broadcasting Co.,4 9 the Court upheld against First Amendment chal-
lenge a federal law prohibiting a radio station licensed to a non-lottery
state from broadcasting ads for another state's lottery-again presum-
ing that banning advertising would reinforce non-lottery states' sub-
stantial interest in lowering demand and hence consumption. Some
observers attempted to read cases such as Posadas and Edge as imply-
ing a "vice" exception to commercial speech protection. Since the de-
mise of Lochner, however, government may ban not only vice but
nearly any economic transaction; that is, it may ban all transactions
that are not independently constitutionally protected. Therefore,
Posadas seemed to suggest a far wider berth for permissible advertis-
ing regulation than Virginia State Board had allowed.5
In more recent terms, however, the Court has granted repeated vic-
tories to advertisers in First Amendment challenges. It has struck
down a ban on the placement of commercial newsracks on city
streets, 2 a ban on cold calls to potential customers by certified public
accountants 5 3 a restriction on the professional designations that ac-
countants may use in their advertising, -' and a federal law barring
beer makers from stating the alcohol content of their beer on their
labels." Along the way, the Court noted that commercial speech may
not be given an automatic discount in the scale of First Amendment
values.56 And most recently, in 44 Liquornart, Inc. v. Rhode Island s7
the Court largely returned to the premises of Virginia State Board in
unanimously striking down a state ban on the truthful advertisement
of liquor prices. While the Justices were divided as to the appropriate
standard of scrutiny, all expressed strong skepticism toward the state's
use of advertising regulation to reduce information about a product in
49. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
50. See id at 431-36.
51. See Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas
Strange, 'Tivas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitifid, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 12-13 (noting that, if "advertising of any economic activity that was not itself
constitutionally protected activity, however legal that activity might be, was properly
subject to government censorship . . . ,then, under Posadas, there is no advertising
that is not subject to government censorship").
52. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
53. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
54. See Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'i Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy,
512 U.S. 136 (1994).
55. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
56. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428 ("In the absence of some basis for
distinguishing between 'newspapers' and 'commercial handbills'..., we are unwilling
to recognize Cincinnati's bare assertion that the 'low value' of commercial speech is a
sufficient justification for its selective and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing
'commercial handbills."').
57. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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order to induce consumers not to buy it-the very rationale that had
been accepted in Central Hudson, Posadas, and Edge.58
Advertising by lawyers has occupied something close to the position
occupied by the advertising of vice-that is, it has been held only
equivocally protected by the First Amendment.59 In its opinion in
Bates v. State Bar,60 the Court struck down a total ban on price adver-
tising by lawyers in a decision largely tracking the libertarian premises
of Virginia State Board. In allowing lawyers to advertise a fee sched-
ule for services at a legal clinic for the poor, Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion for the Court rejected arguments that a prophylactic total ban on
lawyer advertising could be justified by state interests in preserving
professional integrity, ensuring accurate information, preventing bur-
dens on the judicial system, or preventing an increase in the price or a
decrease in the quality of legal services.61 In later cases, the Court
struck down a bar against the use of pictures in a legal advertisement 62
and a ban on soliciting legal business by mailing targeted advertise-
ments.63 But it also, as discussed earlier, upheld a ban on the in-per-
son solicitation of legal business for pecuniary gain,64 and upheld state
sanctions for lawyers' misleading omissions in advertisements. 65 Most
recently, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. ,66 the Court narrowly up-
held a state bar rule prohibiting lawyers from sending targeted direct-
mail solicitations to accident or disaster victims or their families within
thirty days of the accident or disaster to seek their legal business, or
from receiving referrals from anyone who made such contact.
The decisions upholding professional ethics regulations against First
Amendment challenges are difficult to square with the Court's other
advertising decisions. Ohralik, which permitted states to bar personal
solicitation of new business by lawyers in order to prevent "fraud, un-
due influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexa-
tious conduct,"' 67 stands in direct contrast to Edenfield v. Fane,6s
58. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech:
The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123 (1996) (discussing the
ramifications of the commercial speech line of cases on current First Amendment
jurisprudence).
59. Also, vice advertising is arguably doing much better now, as the Court has
expressly rejected the notion that "legislatures have broader latitude to regulate
speech that promotes socially harmful activities, such as alcohol consumption, than
they have to regulate other types of speech." Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2. Liquormart
implicitly reaffirmed this point. See Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484.
60. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
61. See id. at 368-79.
62. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 627 (1985).
63. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 467 (1988).
64. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 448 (1978); see also supra
notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing Ohralik).
65. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636.
66. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
67. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 (citation omitted).
68. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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which held by a vote of eight to one that a state may not bar certified
public accountants from personal solicitation of prospective clients.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy did not overrule but rather
distinguished Ohralik.69 Kennedy suggested that because lawyers are
more skillful manipulators than accountants, and accounting clients
are more sophisticated consumers than those who need legal services,
the state's interests in accuracy, client privacy, and professional integ-
rity are more directly served by limiting lawyer solicitation than by
limiting accountant solicitation.70 In other words, the difference in
outcomes turned solely on broad generalizations about the profes-
sional attributes of lawyers and accountants.
Florida Bar similarly contrasts sharply with other advertising deci-
sions. Justice O'Connor, who is generally the Justice most willing to
uphold government regulation of professional advertising, wrote the
opinion for the five-Justice majority.71 She found that the thirty-day
waiting period closely served substantial interests in protecting the
"flagging reputations of Florida lawvyers" - by preventing them from
engaging in conduct publicly perceived as crass, and in protecting "the
privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones
against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers. ' 73
This holding raised considerable tension with Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n,74 which had invalidated a ban on direct-mail solicitation by
lawyers "targeted" to specific recipients known to need legal services
of a particular kind, distinguishing Ohralik on the ground that mail is
easier to ignore or discard than a live lawyer. In Florida Bar, Justice
O'Connor sought to distinguish Shapero by stressing that a limited
69. See id. at 767-77.
70. See id. at 774-75.
71. For example, Justice O'Connor dissented from the decisions invalidating re-
strictions on accountant advertising in Ibanez v. Florida Board of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136, 149-53 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 778-81 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and urged the overrule of Bates in her
dissent in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480-91 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The majority opinion in Florida Bar was unsurprisingly joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who, along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer, favors defer-
ence to regulation of professional speech. Justice Thomas' willingness to uphold the
regulation of lawyer speech is notable in light of the strong stand he took in Li-
quormart against regulations aimed at manipulating consumer decisions in other com-
mercial markets through forced ignorance. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 518-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Justice Kennedy filed a
pointed dissent in Florida Bar emphasizing its deviation from past advertising deci-
sions and echoing Virginia State Board of Pharnacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Counci4 Inc, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), in stressing that targeted solicitation may serve the
interests of consumer protection for "little people"-those who urgently need legal
advice but lack the "education, linguistic ability, or familiarity with the legal system"
necessary to seek out legal representation on their own. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 643
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625.
73. Id. at 624.
74. 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
1998
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
waiting period was less restrictive than a total ban, and that targeted
mail intrudes more upon privacy interests than mail to the world at
large.75 But Florida Bar is the first decision of the Court to extend the
rationale of protecting privacy (or, more specifically protecting a
"captive audience" from intrusive communications that would be
costly to avoid) to restrictions on the receipt of mail. In previous mail
regulation cases, including one invalidating a ban on the mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for condoms, 76 the Court had held that the
government may not protect homeowners by preempting offensive
mail when they had the ready and less restrictive alternative of taking
the "short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can." 77
II. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF LAWYER SPEECH
The advertising cases repeat a pattern observed earlier in the solici-
tation and lawyer commentary cases: the Court gives greater defer-
ence to state interests in regulating lawyer speech than the
comparable speech of others. Accountants are freer than lawyers to
cold-call client prospects, and condom advertisers are freer to blanket
mailboxes with condom ads than lawyers are to do so with offers of
legal services.
Even assuming that there are substantial state interests in prevent-
ing consumers from fraud and overreaching, and that these interests
may be served by regulation falling somewhere along a spectrum be-
tween leaving advertising wholly unregulated or wholly banned, the
question remains why the Court would allow government to strike the
balance for lawyers closer to prohibition than it does for other busi-
nesses. Even assuming that all commercial speech may be regulated
for being misleading, the question remains why government may more
readily presume that lawyer representations are misleading than it
may in other markets.
There is no obvious economic reason why this should be so. Law-
yers are members of a regulated profession, but so are pharmacists
and accountants. Lawyers hold a license attesting to particular com-
petence but so do plumbers and landscape architects. Lawyers enjoy
the competitive advantages of regulated monopoly but so do holders
of taxi medallions and operators of public utilities. Lawyers know far
more about law than their clients, but information asymmetry creates
moral hazards (such as the incentive to lie about the gravity of a prob-
lem) for auto mechanics as well. Indeed, market failures lead to gov-
ernment intervention in many markets in which the Court has
nonetheless held that advertising restrictions are unconstitutional,
75. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 629-30.
76. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
77. Id. at 72 (citation omitted); see also Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 643 (Kennedy, J..
dissenting) (noting that any problem of offensiveness is "largely self-policing: Poten-
tial clients will not hire lawyers who offend them").
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forcing the substitution of other regulatory means. Forced disclosure
is an obvious alternative remedy to information asymmetry; ordinary
consumer protection provisions, such as cooling off periods after en-
tering into an agreement, are obvious alternatives to suppressing ad-
vertising or solicitation at the threshold.
Nor is there any unique economic feature of legal services that
make it more likely in this than in other markets that increased com-
petition will dilute quality. At the time Bates v. State BarlM was de-
cided, there were already empirical studies suggesting that the amount
of advertising bore an inverse relationship to price levels in markets
for goods such as eyeglasses and retail drugs,79 which the Court noted
in rejecting the argument that advertising restrictions served as price
controls. Since then, various empirical studies have suggested that ad-
vertising is not correlated with any reduction in the quality of services
provided, whether by optometrists or lawyers.s
If not economic differences, what else might explain the Court's rel-
atively more deferential evaluation of the reasons to regulate attorney
speech? The first and least attractive explanation has to do with self-
interest and regulatory capture. Under this view, restrictions on solic-
itation and advertising serve a collective professional interest in pre-
serving monopoly rents, keeping fees for lawyers artificially high by
increasing information costs to consumers, suppressing price competi-
tion, and erecting barriers to entry. Since lawyers are in charge of
their own regulation, the tendency to adopt regulations reflecting self-
interest is unchecked."' Justice Blackmun hinted at this possibility in-
directly in Bates in rejecting the State's argument that the lawyer ad-
vertising ban reduced overhead costs that might otherwise be passed
along to clients. To the contrary, he wrote, increasing the price of
legal services through a "ban on advertising serves to increase the dif-
ficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable ability ....
[reducing attorneys'] incentive to price competitively. . . ."I While
Blackmun did not directly attribute any self-serving motives to the
bar, he negated the possibility that its motives were altruistic.
A second explanation, again unflattering, might focus on intrabar
factionalism. Under this view, the elite lawyers who tend to dominate
the organized bar-high-priced attorneys who operate through the so-
cial networks of corporate boards and suburban country clubs, ob-
taining clients by discrete referrals, family ties, and long-term
relationships-are willing to impose ethical restrictions that in prac-
tice discriminate against nouveaux legal upstarts. Justice Marshall
78. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
79. See id at 377 & n.34.
80. See McChesney, supra note 43, at 91-92 (summarizing empirical studies).
81. See id. at 87-90 (describing data supporting the protectionist thesis that adver-
tising barriers raise prices to consumers).
82. Bates, 433 U.S. at 377.
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
hinted at such an account in his concurring opinion in Ohralik, refer-
ring to studies suggesting that "the rules against solicitation were de-
veloped by the professional bar to keep recently immigrated lawyers,
who gravitated toward the smaller, personal injury practice, from ef-
fective entry into the profession. '8 3 A more benign variant on this
view would recast the issue less as professional snobbery than as pro-
fessional myopia. If bar elites and Supreme Court Justices are drawn
mainly from sectors of the legal market where lawyers compete pri-
marily on results, not price (because price is such a small percentage
of the worth of a transaction) they may not realize how important
price competition, and hence solicitation and advertising, is with re-
spect to many kinds of routine legal claims brought by persons of low
and middle income.
A third explanation would identify the relatively lesser protection
of lawyer speech with professional image preservation. According to
this view, it is important that lawyers perceive themselves, and/or that
the public perceive lawyers, as involved in the pursuit of a higher call-
ing. Moreover, any commercial practice by lawyers runs the risk of
spillover effects, or negative externalities, on other lawyers or the ad-
ministration of justice as a whole. Advertising may in some cases be
the tool of qualified entrepreneurs who in fact improve the availability
of affordable legal services. But, by this logic, if the marketing tech-
niques of even a few bottom-feeding ambulance chasers inspire popu-
lar revulsion, then the costs of allowing advertising may erase the
benefits. Courts upholding professional regulation of lawyer speech
may be concerned that such negative impressions will dilute respect
for the authority of judges, prosecutors, and other justice officials as
well. The concern here is not with the actual quality of service provi-
sion so much as with attitudes held by consumers and observers of
legal services.
The third explanation, aside from being more ethically attractive
than the first two, accords most closely with the rhetoric of opinions
that would uphold lawyer speech regulation against First Amendment
challenge. For example, Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,8 4 noted that membership in the bar
"entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of eco-
nomic success by adhering to standards of conduct,"85 and that pro-
motional restrictions are valuable devices for reminding "the
practicing attorney of why it is improper for any member of this pro-
fession to regard it as a trade or occupation like any other."86 This, of
course, is one of the very rationales the Court had previously rejected
83. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 476 (1978) (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part).
84. 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 488 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 490 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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in Bates, which assumed that the public knew well that lawyers "earn
their livelihood at the bar" and found "the postulated connection be-
tween advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be se-
verely strained.""7 Advocates of deference to professional regulation,
however, argue that there is nonetheless something to be gained by
maintaining an image of private lawyers as public servants, or keeping
the public ignorant of the more competitive aspects of law as a busi-
ness. For example, Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority in Florida
Bar that a ban on the solicitation of personal injury business in the
wake of accidents was justified by interests in shoring up the reputa-
tion of lawyers or at least preventing further "erosion of confidence in
the profession. '
But if the reason to repress lawyer speech is to impress the public,
then it is an empirical question whether the public is indeed im-
pressed. On this subject, the empirical evidence in favor of solicita-
tion and advertising bans is severely wanting. The evidence relied on
in Florida Bar, for example, was a summary of data commissioned by
the state bar, which the Court credited as proving that targeted solici-
tation letters decreased respect for lawyers.8 9 But the survey re-
sponses cited by the Court were at best equivocal: for example,
Justice O'Connor found it significant that "27% of direct-mail recipi-
ents reported that their regard for the legal profession and for the
judicial process as a whole was 'lower' as a result of receiving the di-
rect mail,"9 without saying why it was not more significant that sev-
enty-three percent viewed advertising as neutral or positive in relation
to the reputation of the legal profession."1 In his dissent, Justice Ken-
nedy savaged the report as junk science.92
Other empirical studies suggest that there is little reason to suppose
that specific bans on legal self-promotion improve the public image of
lawyers. The Court has held that the First Amendment prohibits re-
strictions on accountant solicitation, and yet polls suggest that the
public has a higher opinion of CPAs than of attorneys.93 While a high
percentage of lawyers tend to blame lawyer advertising for negative
attitudes toward the legal profession, only minute percentages of the
public attribute negative views of lawyers to advertising.' And one
87. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
88. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
89. See id. at 626-28.
90. Id at 627.
91. For criticism of the empirical basis of the Florida Bar ruling, see Ronald D.
Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 Ark. L. Rev. 703, 720-29 (1997).
92. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 640-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
93. See Committee on Advert., American Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Advertising at the
Crossroads: Professional Policy Considerations 67 (1995) (tabulating poll results plac-
ing consumer attitudes toward physicians, dentists, CPAs, and insurance agents ahead
of that toward attorneys).
94. See id at 71.
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ABA-commissioned study suggested that television commercials may
have neutral to positive effects upon consumers' images of the lawyers
in the ad and the legal profession in general.
Even if there were greater empirical support for the claim that re-
stricting promotional activities by lawyers improves lawyers' public
reputation, the question remains why such an enhanced image should
qualify as a substantial government interest, or indeed, as an interest
of the government at all. The answer circles back to the Harlan opin-
ion in Button, and the proposition that lawyers are officers of the
court, or agents of the state. What makes the image of lawyers an
interest of the government is that they participate in the administra-
tion of justice. When they do business they are not simply private
commercial venturers but delegates of state power. Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Florida Bar, echoing Harlan, emphasizes that
"the standards and conduct of state-licensed lawyers have tradition-
ally been subject to extensive regulation by the States." 96
Of course, even ordinary business corporations are delegates of
state power in some sense; state charters give corporations the advan-
tages of perpetual life, limited liability, and other benefits of the cor-
porate form. The Court, however, has expressly rejected arguments
that the extension of such privileges entitles the state to the quid pro
quo of placing greater conditions on corporate than on individual
speech.97 The lawyer speech cases have provided only more qualified
deregulation. The view that speech restrictions are a corollary of
state-created privilege has been more tenacious in the legal than in the
corporate context.
III. PARALLELS FROM GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP CASES
The lawyer speech cases reflect a dichotomy between the Court's
treatment of lawyers as participants in ordinary public or commercial
discourse on a par with other speakers in those realms, and its treat-
ment of lawyers as subject to some additional speech restrictions by
virtue of their ties to state power. This dichotomy can now be related
to broader First Amendment themes. It has been a recurring problem
for First Amendment law that government restrictions on speech arise
sometimes from its role as sovereign, with the coercive power to jail
and tax, and sometimes from its role as property owner, educator, em-
95. See id. at 81-86.
96. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 635.
97. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (rejecting "the propo-
sition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amend-
ment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation"). But see id. at
828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right of political speech is not "inci-
dental to the purposes for which the Commonwealth permitted these corporations to
be organized"). Chief Justice Rehnquist is quite consistent in viewing both corpora-
tions and professions as creatures of the state and subject therefore to greater speech
restrictions than are individuals.
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ployer, or patron. In these latter capacities, government is in some
sense sponsoring the speech it seeks to limit, by affording it space or
subsidy. The question, then, is whether government has greater lee-
way to limit the speech of those it sponsors than it does when impos-
ing coercive rules of general applicability to all citizens.
There are two possible polar positions on this question. One is that
the government is never bound by the First Amendment when it acts
in its proprietary capacities, but has complete allocative discretion in
this realm. On this view, the First Amendment bars only the "abridg-
ment" of speech, not its selective sponsorship, or its sponsorship upon
a speech-restrictive condition. This view is epitomized by Justice Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes's famous epigram that a policeman "may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman."9 The opposite position is that constitutional lim-
its extend to government in proprietary capacities as completely as
they do to government in its sovereign capacity, because the govern-
ment's monopoly of force means that it is never the mere equivalent
of a private actor.
The Supreme Court has rejected both these polar positions, tending
to steer between them by using threshold categorizations to divide the
turf of government sponsorship into public components that are sub-
ject to First Amendment limits and private components that are not.
When speech activity is identified as public in these cases, its restric-
tion by the sponsoring government is treated as akin to the exercise of
sovereign power and subject to constitutional constraints; when it is
identified as private, its restriction is treated as closer to the mere ex-
ercise of managerial prerogative, to which constitutional constraints
do not apply.
For example, consider conditions upon speech on public property,
speech by public school students, speech by public employees, and
speech by recipients of public funds. Under a long line of decisions
recognizing certain public property as public forums, government may
not condition speakers' access to public streets or parks on submission
to government content control or excessive time, place, or manner
regulation. But the Court has exempted a range of government prop-
erty other than streets and parks from such First Amendment limita-
tions by categorizing it as effectively private. For example,
government may exclude speakers from placing circulars in public
school teachers' mailboxes,99 soliciting funds for charitable fund drives
in public workplaces, 100 demonstrating or petitioning on sidewalks
abutting post offices, 10 soliciting donations in airport terminals,' 2 or
98. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
99. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
100. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788(1985).
101. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
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participating in a candidate debate broadcast on public television'1 3 -
even though similar exclusion would not be allowed toward speakers
in streets and parks. Each of these locations within the vast realm of
government property has been deemed a "nonpublic forum," in which
government may condition access as selectively as it likes so long as it
acts reasonably and avoids discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.
Public school students obviously have their speech greatly con-
strained when they participate in the school's own curriculum; no one
may mount a soapbox in the middle of math class. But the Court has
held that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"1°4 and thus may
wear black armbands to class or speak freely as public citizens "in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus. 1 05 This public
status does not extend to student speech in the school's curricular or
quasi-curricular settings: articles may be censored in the school-spon-
sored student newspaper 10 6 and speakers may be edited for lewdness
in school assemblies. 10 7 The Court suggested in these cases that the
government may dissociate itself from speech that might reflect badly
on it, even though it could not censor the speech of individuals acting
outside the scope of its sponsorship for such reasons.
The Court has divided claims against speech-restrictive conditions
on public employment along similar lines. On the one hand, public
employees do not shed their First Amendment rights at the workplace
gate, and government may not without strong justification condition
retention of their jobs on silence in their public capacities as citizens.
A public school teacher may criticize a school board for spending too
much on athletics, 10 8 a clerical worker in a sheriff's office may express
disappointment that an attempted assassination of the President was
unsuccessful, 10 9 and civil servants may receive honoraria for their off-
duty speeches or articles 10 -all without job sanction unless the gov-
ernment can make a particularized showing that such speech will dis-
rupt the workplace or impair government efficiency. On the other
hand, public employees may be freely discharged or demoted for ex-
pressing mere labor grievances internal to their workplace, such as by
fomenting office insurrection against the boss."' The government is
held to have considerable latitude as a manager in these "private"
102. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830
(1992); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992).
103. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
104. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
105. Id. at 512-13.
106. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
107. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
108. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
109. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
110. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
111. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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speech settings, partly out of the functional concern that the efficient
operation of the government sector is incompatible with uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate. The question is how far this manage-
rial function extends; for example, Justice Scalia, dissenting in the case
of the assassination hyperbole, wrote that the government should not
have been forced "to permit one of its employees to 'ride with the
cops and cheer for the robbers."'1 12
CONCLUSION
In challenges to the selective allocation of public funds to some
speakers and not others, the Court has invalidated use of the leverage
of government funding to alter what the speaker would otherwise say
as a public citizen with his or her own resources, but has held that
government's mere refusal to subsidize speech of particular content is
constitutional, unless aimed at the suppression of a particular view-
point. For example, government may not condition a public broad-
casting subsidy on a station's foregoing all editorializing even if
funded with member contributions.' 13 But government may withhold
a subsidy in the form of tax benefits from the lobbying efforts of a
nonprofit organization when the witholding does not affect the non-
lobbying speech or advocacy of the organization," 4 and may withhold
family planning funds from health care entities that advocate or coun-
sel women about abortion. 15 These cases again express concern that
the First Amendment not be read to force government, as an entail-
ment of funding some speech, to place an imprimatur of approval
upon other speech that will reflect badly on its policies. As Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in one of these decisions, "when
the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program.""' 6
Returning now to lawyer speech, it is evident that the Court en-
gages in a similar bifurcation of speakers' public and private status in
relation to the government that grants lawyers their professional li-
cense. When speaking in clearly public capacities-for example, when
helping the NAACP to recruit plaintiffs, representing criminal defend-
ants, or setting price schedules in legal clinics-lawyers receive rela-
tively robust free speech protection. When speaking in capacities that
might adversely implicate the administration of justice or perception
of administration of justice by the government-for example, when
chasing ambulance occupants into hospital rooms or soliciting acci-
dent victims by mail-the Court has regarded the government as freer
to place conditions on its sponsorship. It would plainly be untenable
112. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 394 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
114. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
115. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
116. Id. at 194.
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for the Court to treat lawyers as entirely the agents of the state, for
part of their very job description within the administration of justice is
to challenge the state-for example, in the capacities of criminal de-
fense lawyer or civil rights litigator. Moreover, lawyer speech may
have special authority and importance to public judgment precisely
because of the special knowledge and insight that comes with profes-
sional training.
The danger to free speech in such settings arises when government
is permitted to define its functional interests too broadly. For exam-
ple, if an attorney general defines the "efficient" operation of his of-
fice as requiring "public confidence" in the ability of all his employees
to respect and enforce the law, then an otherwise excellent assistant
attorney general who proclaims her same-sex relationship in a state
that bans sodomy might well be fired.'17 But it is certainly open to
question whether irrational public prejudice toward gay people ought
to count as a functional consideration or as the kind of majoritarian
ideological preference that is usually unable to trump a speech right.
Similarly, it is hardly clear that broad assumptions about public regard
for the legal profession-especially if only weakly empirically demon-
strated-ought to provide the basis for limiting lawyer promotional
practices that cannot be shown to cause clients demonstrable material
harm.
Of course, even under general First Amendment principles, speech
may be regulated as to time, place, and manner or for a variety of
content-neutral ends. The question in lawyer solicitation and advertis-
ing cases is whether lawyer-specific speech regulations are really
needed to serve these ends or whether problems of fraud, misrepre-
sentation, and overreaching may be adequately controlled by gener-
ally applicable background consumer protection laws, such as post-
contractual cooling off periods, forced disclosure rules, and prohibi-
tions on commercial fraud.
117. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (finding
no First Amendment violation where the Attorney General withdrew an applicant's
job offer upon learning of her lesbian marriage).
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